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 On the basis of a short summary of phenomenological aims and methods, this essay 
describes the present state of relationships between phenomenology and analytic 
philosophy, pointing out the progress done in the last years on the way of their 
rapprochement, after a long time of reciprocal scorn and misunderstandings. In the way 
of a presentation of the Phenomenology Lab and Center’s present and future research 
program, it recalls some relevant chapters of past and present phenomenological 
research in Europe, and quite particularly in Italy. After discussing some aspects 
of contemporary debates in phenomenology and philosophy of mind, it attempts at 
establishing a convergent line of argument toward the assessment of an anti-reductive 
ontology of concreteness, or the life world.
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Phenomenology has been here for a century, and yet not so many philosophers, 
among both traditional supporters and opponents, do really understand its 
novelty. Too many scholars, also, have usurped its beautiful name, without 
sharing its spirit, without applying or developing the methods for philosophical 
research on vital topics in our contemporary world, for which it had been 
devised.
What is, in fact, the spirit of phenomenology? I wish to propose a sort of key-
principle which is just meant to point to that spirit, or rather to remind us 
of a style of thinking, which might be clarified through some more definite 
methodological principles1. In this introduction I do not want to get into 
methodological details, though: for the sake of this general presentation, I shall 
first try to evoke that style of thinking by a formula which I shall term the 
Principle of Epistemic Trust:
(ET) Nothing appears in vain (without a foundation in reality) – of course 
the reverse is not true: there is much more to discover in reality than 
what appears (otherwise no research would be needed, and we would be 
omniscient).
The first thing I want to convey by this formula is that phenomenology has 
been so widely misunderstood, because we have not yet – not in the least – 
understood the whole depth of Plato’s summons: sozein ta fainomena, to “save” 
phenomena. That is, things which are seen, things which appear.
Phenomenology so characterized seems to radically escape what the French 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur termed the “culture of suspicion”. Under such a phrase 
I understand the mental attitude quite opposed to epistemic trust: a complete 
lack of confidence in the world of phenomena, that is in the ordinary world of 
our daily experience. 
Now, quite independently of Ricoeur’s references (“The masters of suspicion”), 
this lack of confidence in the truthfulness of experience itself seems to 
characterize a new and radical form of scepticism. Our age is, as I believe, an age 
of scepticism: but of a quite peculiar kind. It is a form of life and consciousness, a 
mentality much more than a sophisticated theory. It is a paradoxical form of life, 
in which our ordinary experience – sensory, emotional, “cognitive” and “moral” 
– seems such that we can avoid taking it seriously.
The principle of 
epistemic trust
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Over the last century, philosophy of culture as well as philosophy of nature 
have proposed many reasons to doubt that things are as they appear. A majority 
of continental philosophers of the twentieth century on the one side, and the 
mainstream naturalism striving toward an image of the world compatible with 
contemporary science on the other, suggest that our experience (and our moral 
experience quite particularly) is a pervasive, systematic illusion. They could be 
right. Why has this happened? The story would be too long to tell: we shall limit 
ourselves to pointing to the two mentioned contemporary forms of scepticism 
concerning visible things – or the visible and sensible life-world – which we may 
term Post-modern Relativism and Reductive Materialism.
The first one has been the dominant philosophy of culture, whereas the second 
one has been the dominant natural philosophy of mind and nature. Both 
represent a form of scepticism relative to the immediately given things of our 
life-world, including ourselves, human persons, and our world: the life-world, 
as a phenomenologist would have it, or the world of encounters, according to a 
nice expression proposed by Lynne Baker.
According to Post-modernism no real epistemic credit can be given to 
immediate cognition or consciousness – no form of intuition, acquaintance, 
perception, feeling is a mode of veridical experience, the world being as it were 
wrapped up in language, culture, interpretations. 
But according to Reductive Materialism, phenomena are epi-phenomena, 
just shadows or dreams caused by a completely different reality. Take for 
example Dennett’s Consciousness explained, which has a nice chapter, “The 
phenomenological garden”2: we do not find a description of a real scene like the 
one surrounding the reader, or of a fictional one, similar enough to a human 
life-world environment of the XXth century on earth, but just a list of qualia, or 
sense data, in three classes: 
1. “Experiences” of the outer world, such as views, sounds, smells, 
sensations of slippery or rough, of warm and cold, and of our body’s 
position; 
2. “Experiences” of the inner world, such as imaged views and sounds, 
memories, ideas and insights;
3. “Experiences” of emotions and feelings.
All that is purely “subjective”, that is belonging to what contemporary 
philosophers of mind call phenomenal consciousness.
Actually, questioning the reliability of sensory and sensible experience has been 
a main trend in the history of modern philosophy, starting indeed from Descartes 
1.
Scepticism and 
phenomenology
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doubt, going on with Galileo and Locke’s expulsion of secondary qualities from 
the furniture of the real world, and so on. Yet the “age of suspicion” which 
induced modern science to doubt the world of everyday experience was at its 
beginnings in Descartes’ days. Nowadays we can perfectly conceive of a world 
such as that of Matrix, where no experienced object is really as it appears: steaks 
are nothing but tasty qualia and people themselves are nothing but the characters 
of a (shared) dream, while their true life is lived somewhere else…
In fact, the “phenomenological garden” of Dennett or the world of Matrix are just 
sets of beautifully arranged qualia, which would support the universal negation 
of our Principle of Epistemic Trust:
(N) All appears in vain
 
(N) supports a version of (epi)phenomenalism. And phenomenalism is surely 
no phenomenology, but the very opposite way of thinking: a radical form of 
scepticism about phenomena. 
Take any issue in contemporary philosophy of mind: the “hard problem”of 
consciousness, that is the nature of any form of direct cognition, such as 
perception, emotion, empathy, self–perception; or the nature of the self and 
personal identity; or – most important for meta-ethics and legal philosophy, the 
issue of free will. All of them can be reduced to the general problem of epistemic 
trust, that is, of reliability of ordinary experience. 
What is the status of epistemic trust? It would be sad if the principle just 
were meant as a dogma. But, as we said, it is at most a heuristic principle, or 
the expression of a style of philosophical research, engaging a philosopher, 
above all, to a most faithful conceptualization and precise description of any 
phenomenological feature appearing to be relevant to the very nature of the 
concerned thing. It is the outset of a (non-sceptical) thought practice, more than 
a statement looking for an argument.
On the other hand, no argument seems to be conclusive against this scepticism 
about appearances. What is needed is a deep change in our customary way 
of thinking. A change not only relative to modern philosophy, but to ancient 
philosophy as well (there is no interesting way back to the past). Phenomenology 
is this kind of “revolution”. The Principle of Epistemic Trust is about the relations 
between appearance and reality. Now, we are inclined to think that the true 
reality of a thing resides more in the hidden that in the apparent part of the 
thing. That the thing actually is what is its hidden part. A stone, for example, 
is ultimately its physical structure, the particles out of which it is composed 
and the forces which keep them together. But even if you are no materialist 
concerning human persons, even if you think that the real substance of a human 
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person is her soul, you are inclined to think of this substance as a hidden reality. 
In any case the true reality of a thing is thought of by opposition to its 
appearance. Ordinary language suggests this almost inevitably. Moreover, 
we are inclined to conceive of this relationship in terms of causation: reality 
“causes” or “determines” appearance, the latter is a “resultant” of the former, 
the surface is a product of the underlying reality.
In short, what is founding is ontologically more important than what is founded; 
the “basis” or the “inside” is more real than what “emerges” at the surface. A 
kind of atavistic mental grammar tacitly induces us into thinking that the entity 
and identity of a thing reside more in its hidden “basis” than in its ”emerging” 
properties: water is really in its molecules rather than in its liquidity and 
transparency, a person’s reality in her biological basis than in her personal 
flourishing, and so on… 
This atavistic grammar is what we call ontology: reductive materialism and dualism 
are but different versions of it, sharing the above mentioned foundational principle. 
But in fact, what we customarily mean by ontology is just an ontology, and one 
which is to be deeply revised. This deep revision is phenomenology. 
Phenomenology completely redefines the relations between appearance and 
reality. “Phenomenon” is no longer a synonym of “sheer appearance”, nor 
of course of “subjective distortion”. The word refers to what we shall call the 
emerging structure of a thing.
This emerging structure bears the essential properties of the thing itself and 
hence manifests its specific identity. It tells us what type of thing the thing is. 
There is no possible world where a sound – a full fledged sound as the ones 
we can hear – would not have some pitch, some timber or tone-colour, some 
duration – or else it would be no sound. So, the typical identity of a thing – of a 
state of affairs, of a relation, of an event – is given, so to speak, by its “surface”. 
This surface – the “phenomenon” can be conceived as the very manifestation of 
the ontological significance (and richness) of the thing itself. 
This way of thinking seems to be inspiring most of the papers published in this 
issue, deep down into their specific subjects – whether the authors refer or not to 
the phenomenological tradition – so that my general hints can be verified on each 
of the concerned topics, across such different concrete approaches as Vittorio 
Gallese’s embodied simulation theory, Shaun Gallagher’s anti-reductive thesis on 
first person perspective, Lynne Baker’s constitution theory of persons, Elisabetta 
Sacchi’s phenomenological account of aspectuality and Francesca De Vecchi’s 
analysis of three essentially different phaenomena of shared intentionality – not 
to mention many relevant contributions by younger researchers. 
The fruitful results of this anti-sceptical approach are among the reasons why 
phenomenology is experiencing a new life, the life of a philosophical method 
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devised to address those classical topics in philosophy of mind and the sciences 
of the person, that recent progress in the cognitive neurosciences have made 
even sharper and more urgent. A method, though, devised to address them 
with analytical rigour and disciplined experience, in a close cooperation with 
experimental research, as it was the case during the first decades of its life. The 
phenomenological Mind, a book from which we borrowed the title and the general 
subject of the first one of the international meetings to be promoted by our 
Research Center, does express and thoroughly exemplify this new attitude. It 
powerfully contributes to making phenomenology respectable again among 
philosophers who don’t share in the least that ignorant contempt for science, 
logics and conceptual analysis, which has been so disastrous for the intellectual 
reputation of too many alleged heirs of the phenomenological tradition. It 
gives us a common language, without forcing us to give up our methods of 
experience’s description and essential discovery. It makes phenomenology a 
good travel mate for analytic philosophers – or, this is the future we try to make 
possible. This is why we are grateful to Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher, for 
being there, respectively, as a keynote speaker at our 2010 Winter School and as 
a central contributor to the first issue of Phenomenology and Mind.
Edmund Husserl used to dream of a philosophical community as universal as 
the scientific ones of the modern world, and yet as personally absorbing, as 
intellectually, morally, even existentially motivating as a Platonic symposium. 
Perhaps any true phenomenological philosopher since has tried to found such 
a community – and we are trying too, once again. I am persuaded that time is 
much more favourable to such an endeavour now, than it has ever been after 
World War Two. I shall try to explain why. On my way of doing so, I first wish to 
present the young and dynamic research community which happened to find 
in the Research Center in Phenomenology and the Sciences of Person, based at 
Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, and in the associated Phenomenology Lab, 
a first place of virtual encounter and a means of communication. This had a 
first opportunity of actual encounter and common work during the 2010 Winter 
School, where most papers now published on this journal where first presented 
and discussed. The whole enterprise was brought about in a spirit of freedom 
and self-organization, created so to speak spontaneously by its very participants. 
That Winter School worked as a real place for synphilosophein, and seemed to 
have inherited a spark at least of the enthusiasm which used to animate the 
first phenomenological circles. What I say must not be understood in a nostalgic 
mood: I do believe that we are living a new beginning. 
To see why, we must widen the horizon from our small community to the whole 
phenomenological renewed movement which is reviving all debates about 
consciousness, mind, embodied mind, action and agency, feeling and willing, 
2.
A new interna-
tional research 
community?
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social cognition, self and person, values, norms, social ontology – all over the 
world. We shall widen the horizon gradually, by larger and larger circles so 
to speak, pretty much in the spirit of Husserl’s famous piecemeal description 
of wider and wider skylines of the surrounding life-world – perceptual, 
geographical, historical, social – in Ideas I3. 
So let me start from a first wider circle, encompassing our present community 
as its historical and geographical context of birth – the Italian phenomenological 
tradition, rooted in this city, and quite particularly in the Alma Mater of some 
of us, the Università degli Studi di Milano. This not only has been represented 
at our Winter School by the phenomenological- experimental work of Corrado 
Sinigaglia, but actually was, through him and his research group, among the 
organizers and sponsors of the School. 
It is no redundancy, in the present international context, to recall the fact that 
the Università degli Studi di Milano has been the most important center for the 
study and the spread of phenomenology (mainly Husserlian one) in this country, 
since Antonio Banfi (before the Second World War) and Enzo Paci (from the 
Fifties onward). I myself was but a schoolgirl when I first heard a lecture held by 
Paci: therefore I am old enough to have met Paci’s more brilliant pupils, and to 
have learned a lot from them. Paci’s students developed different interests from 
the same phenomenological stump: among them two of my masters had already 
shown the ways to approach analytic philosophy from a phenomenological 
background, and this line of continuity with what we are trying to do here 
makes it a duty and a pleasure for me to mention them: Andrea Bonomi, who 
became a philosopher of language and logics, and Giovanni Piana who practiced 
a sort of experimental phenomenology on several modalities of perception 
and related objects (especially sounds and musical objects), imagination and 
experience generally. Both were well acquainted with Frege, Wittgenstein, 
the Gestalt Psychologists and their Italian heirs such as Gaetano Kanizsa and 
Paolo Bozzi, who introduced James Gibson to Italian students. But I also wish 
to mention at least Dino Formaggio, the father of Italian Phenomenological 
Aesthetics, which promoted research both in general and in special philosophy 
of art, partly in collaboration with Mikel Dufrenne, without neglecting aesthetics 
as phenomenology of each specific sensory modality, in Dufrenne’s spirit, and 
the Italian school of phenomenological psychiatry, with Lorenzo Calvi, Bruno 
Callieri, Arnaldo Ballerini and their pupils4. 
Mentioning this tradition, well represented in the scientific board of our 
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Research Center by these masters’ successors (Elio Franzini, Paolo Spinicci, 
Vincenzo Costa, Carlo Serra) is more than a due act of gratitude. It is the premise 
of an engagement, that our Lab feels also due, to support any attempt to the 
effect of making the best works of those masters easily available again, and above 
all of making them known and accessible to the international phenomenological 
community. Much is waiting to be rediscovered and shared in the light of our 
research’s present developments – not only in this purely philosophical tradition, 
but in some of its applied expansions as well: phenomenological psychology, 
phenomenological psychiatry, phenomenology of education5.
The next horizon to be considered is much wider. Let me introduce it by 
considering the span between two poles that were for a long time considered as 
opposed to each other: phenomenology and analytic philosophy.
We hope to be the founders of a community of analytically minded 
phenomenologists. I understand the expression “analytically minded” 
in a broad sense, which is best clarified by a statement made by the 
Munich phenomenologist Moritz Geiger (a pupil of Alexander Pfaender): 
“Phenomenology is a passion for differences”. 
But I also mean the expression in a stricter sense, more or less in the spirit of 
Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher’s book. Its authors seem to be succeeding in 
an enterprise in which many others failed across the years, namely, to make 
phenomenology again intellectually respectable in the opinion of the scientific 
minded philosophers. No longer a muddled set of question-begging generalities, 
or – even worse – a post-Derridean conversational art, frivolously spurning logic 
and sometimes ethics, but a technique to provide valuable insights in the study of 
most widely debated topics in contemporary philosophy. 
This was a big achievement, for most analytical philosophers of my generation 
would have agreed with Thomas Metzinger when he proclaimed phenomenology 
to be “a discredited research program… intellectually bankrupt for at least 50 
years”6. (One relevant exception was Michael Dummett in Oxford: he was well 
acquainted with Lotze and other predecessors of Frege, but did not ignore, as most 
of his colleagues, Husserl’s Logical Investigations. His encouragement on occasion 
of the preface he wrote to the printed Italian version of my thesis7 was decisive in 
persuading me that a phenomenologist could be a good research partner for an 
analytical philosopher. I never had doubted the other way round, of course). 
Many important things happened since. Among them Gallagher and Zahavi 
(2008) point out three developments in cognitive science, which brought about 
PHENOMENOLOGY TODAY: A GOOD TRAVEL MATE FOR ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY?
5 One should mention at least the work by Piero Bartolini: cfr. Tarozzi (Ed.), (2006), 
and the remarkable work by his pupil M. Tarozzi, editor of “Encyclopaideia - Rivista di 
fenomenologia, Pedagogia, Formazione”, Clueb, Bologna.
6 Gallagher, Zahavi (2008), 2.
7 Dummett (1982), XI-XXX.
ROBERTA DE MONTICELLI Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele
27
a possible rehabilitation of phenomenology: 1. A revived interest in phenomenal 
consciousness; 2. The advent of embodied approaches to cognition; 3. The 
amazing progress in neuroscience and – I would add – the increasing need for 
accurate description of life-world phenomena whose neurobiological correlates 
one wants to investigate.
About 150 years have gone by since Husserl’s birth: but, as Gallagher and Zahavi 
point out, no divide comparable to the one who took place later on occurred 
during the first decades of last century. Franz Brentano, Gottlob Frege, Edmund 
Husserl, William James, Bertrand Russell – to quote only some major figures – 
were all directly or indirectly aware of each other’s works.
We should also recall many predecessors of Zahavi and Gallagher in the above 
mentioned rapprochement between philosophy and sciences of the mind – and 
of the embodied mind, or person. Among them are many former members 
of the Munich and Goettingen early phenomenological circles (from Herbert 
Spiegelberg to Dietrich von Hildebrand, from Roman Ingarden to Alfred Schutz 
– and many others). Having survived Nazi persecution through emigration, they 
spread our way of thinking and methods of research all over the world. To this 
direct inheritance belongs the uninterrupted tradition of phenomenology and 
experimental phenomenology within psychology and psychiatry, represented 
by the Dutch School, Erwin Straus, Ludwig Binswanger, Eugène Minkowski, 
Georges Lantéri-Laura, Wolfgang Blankenburg, Kimura Bin, and their followers 
down to the experimentally and philosophically impeccable present researches 
of Amedeo Giorgi, Matthew Ratcliffe’s and Giovanni Stanghellini8.
We should not forget, of course, the relevant developments in formal and 
material ontology rooted in Husserl’s III Logical Investigation (on Parts and 
Wholes), quite particularly Peter Simons’ mereology and Barry Smith’s 
biomedical ontology; as, more generally, Kevin Mulligan’s pioneering works 
about the so called Austrian-analytic philosophy9. Nor should we ignore all the 
scholars and researchers who contributed to a better understanding of our 
classics in the phenomenological Archives of Europe, Löwen, Freiburg, Munich, 
Cologne and Paris (among them three members of our scientific board, Verena 
Mayer, Dieter Lohmar and Jocelyn Benoist).
Last but perhaps not least, the rich variety of Italian phenomenological schools 
which our website, Phenomenology Lab, was born to give voice to. Some hints 
to the former phenomenological school of Milan were given above. Among 
the other Italian traditions in this field, it seems worthy of notice that our 
most important philosopher of law and politics (Norberto Bobbio, 1909-2004) 
wrote his first important book on social and legal philosophy within the 
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phenomenological movement10: his pages on Husserl, and those on Scheler, 
Reinach and Kaufmann still retain their unequalled lucidity. Social ontology, 
on the other hand, which was first – and far before John Searle – outlined as 
an independent material ontology by Adolf Reinach, as well as by the polish 
philosopher Czesław Znamierowski (introduced in Italy by two members of our 
Center, Wojciech Żełaniec and Giuseppe Lorini) has found in Pavia and Milan 
a flourishing prosecution within the school of Amedeo G. Conte (Gianpaolo 
Azzoni, Paolo Di Lucia, Lorenzo Passerini Glazel, Stefano Colloca). The so-called 
“realist” phenomenology has been explored through essays and translations 
at the University of Bologna, where the legacy of Ezio Melandri is still alive 
(Stefano Besoli and others)11. Some women phenomenologists – from Edith 
Stein to Edwige Conrad Martius and Gertha Walter have been a privileged object 
of study within the school of Angela Ales Bello at the Pontificia Universitas 
Lateranensis in Rome, where Ales Bello founded the Centro Italiano di Ricerche 
Fenomenologiche in 1974.
Finally, I shall hint at those research fields which seem – up to now – to be the 
best covered by our Research Center. Persons and social objects make up the two 
main regional ontologies on which our work has focused. Two out of the three 
traditionally described spheres of consciousness – or rather personal life (cognitive, 
emotional and conative acts) – have been privileged and are being studied, both in 
their fundamental structures and relative to recent neuroscientifical findings. The 
nature of decisions and of freedom of action and/or will, neurophenomenology, 
empathy and structures of the emotional sensibility are current subjects of research 
and discussion, as well as social cognition, social acts, ontology of institutions and 
artefacts, theories of values and norms, foundations of practical rationality and 
personal responsibility, foundations of ethics12.
After the Winter School 2010 we have been working at the organization of a 
Spring School (June 7-9, 2011) centerd on Social Ontology and John Searle’s last 
book – Making the social world. Here are our present contributions to what we hope 
is going to renew the spirit of early phenomenology – on a planetary level. 
Let me conclude on the possible upshot of all that. Europe, from Cracow 
to Oxford, passing through Copenhagen and Paris does share a common 
philosophical language again. Or at least it could. We do master one again. 
We have gone through the very beginning of a major philosophical turn in this 
century: the outset of a gradual reciprocal understanding between modern 
cognitive (neuro)science and phenomenology. We are learning to conceive 
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of them as two complementary efforts aiming at – respectively – the study of 
the necessary neurological basis of a personal life, and their embeddings in 
the relevant whole of a living (human) person, which is the last subject of all our 
scientific inquiry. Phenomenology has shown the importance of replacing vague 
everyday talk about such pseudo-entities as “representations”, “sense data”, 
“qualia” or even about unanalyzed, complex phenomena such as the mind, 
the soul, the body and the natural, artificial and social objects of the life world, 
with rigorous, true to life, “phänomengerecht” descriptions of those things as 
experienced, and of the experience we make of them. For experience and the 
experienced world are the very background of our scientific enquiry, as well as 
the concrete embeddings of all normativity: logical, axiological, practical. They 
are the very foundations of our “normal” reason – theoretical or practical.
While many of the best analyses on phenomenology are methodological essays 
presenting a possibly fruitful new approach to the cognitive sciences and the 
philosophy of mind, many of the best analyses in phenomenology are, so to speak, 
essays in the ontology of concreteness – of life and of the experienced world. 
Epistemic trust has proved itself a fruitful attitude via the rich variety of 
material ontologies which have been addressed since Husserl and Scheler’s 
times. Whenever single types of “things themselves” – ideal or mathematical 
objects, special art domains, kinds of social objects, artefacts or institutions, 
material and formal axiology and so on – have been investigated, most 
sterile scholarly disputations on the kind of Weltanschauung compatible with 
phenomenology have tended to die down. Meanwhile, a shared theoretical 
and methodological principle seems to have imposed itself within and beyond 
the phenomenological circles: being founded on something does not mean 
being reducible to it. Along with rigour in descriptions, the major contribution 
of phenomenology to philosophical knowledge seems to be the concept of 
ontological dependence or Fundierung, developed on a formal level by several 
researchers on the basis of Husserl’s pioneering logical investigation on parts 
and wholes13. This most useful tool of “antireductive metaphysics”, constituting 
a relevant contribution to analytic ontology, enables us to escape both dead 
ends of the alternative between dualisms and reductionisms of all sorts. It also 
proves precious in making sense both of our increasing knowledge of nature 
in ourselves and of the increasing demands of practical reason (justice) in our 
personal and social world.
To sum up, I really hope that some at least among the contributions to this 
issue will work as basic bricks of a building which we have dreamt of for a very 
long time: a common house for phenomenologists from all countries, maybe 
brought up in different traditions, maybe trained in different philosophical or 
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scientific disciplines, but all sharing that deep wish for clarity and evidence and 
that incessant quest for rigor in arguing and “Sachlichkeit” of issues, which 
are constitutive of phenomenology as a method of philosophical research, 
along with the caring attention to the richness and irreducible subtlety of 
the apparent world, and the engagement to “save the phenomena”, which 
distinguish phenomenology as a philosophical attitude. Here are some of the 
reasons we have to believe that we are facing a new beginning in philosophy. 
Thank you for helping us to realize this hope. 
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